We use a Chinese …rm-director level panel dataset to examine the matching of heterogeneous …rms and politicians. Based on 36,308 detailed biographies, we identify individuals that previously held bureaucratic positions and classify the rank of each position in the Chinese political hierarchy. Using this direct measure of political capital, we examine how …rms with heterogeneous productivity match with politicians with di¤erent political strength. Our results indicate a positive assortative matching in the political markets. More productive …rms recruit more powerful politicians. Further, the preference for political capital relative to conventional human capital increases in …rms'dependence on external …nancing and decreases in the e¢ ciency of local governments. Conditional on the endogenous matching, new hires with greater political strength receive more compensation than their co-workers in the same cohort. The marginal e¤ect of a one-step rise in the political ladder exceeds the marginal e¤ect of raising education attainment from, for example, high school to college. 
Introduction
The soaring of China's economy in the past decades has drawn increasing attention to its political system. In contrast to its unprecedented economic growth, China's political liberalization is far less profound. The highly closed political regime continues to rule while the country embraces economic integration. This discrepancy grants new economic values to political capital as rent-seeking activities move from an autarkic environment to a fast-growing open economy.
A large number of studies have shown that political connections play an important role in …rms' economic performance around the world. 1 Existing evidence suggests that political connections help …rms secure favorable regulatory conditions, gain access to resources, and receive preferential treatment in legal system. These "bene…ts" are not exclusive to one nation.
They have been identi…ed in both developed and developing countries, including the United States, Brazil, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and China.
In this paper, we take a step back from the conventional focus on evaluating the ex-post e¤ect of political connections and examine instead the endogenous decision of …rms to invest in political capital. We investigate how the di¤erential decisions of …rms to engage in political investment lead to an assortative matching between …rms with heterogeneous physical productivity and politicians with heterogeneous ability. Our analysis contributes to the existing literature by addressing the assignment in political markets, an issue that has received little attention in the past, and comparing that with the assignment in traditional labor markets. Taking into account this endogenous assignment, we identify the price of political capital relative to conventional human capital and evaluate the magnitude of political premium.
Understanding the matching of …rms and political capital is important for a number of reasons. First, it helps establish the causal e¤ect of political connections on …rm performance.
When there is a systematic relationship between …rm productivity and the decision to build political connections, estimating the e¤ect of political connections without taking into account the above relationship is likely to bias the result. Second, a rapidly expanding literature in international economics, led by Melitz (2003) , Bernard and Jensen (1999) , Helpman et al. (2004) and Eaton et al. (2008) , has noted that …rm heterogeneity plays an important role in explaining …rms'entry and exit decision in domestic and international markets. Our analysis, by introducing additional dimensions of heterogeneity in factor markets, complements the above literature and helps identify potential sources of …rm heterogeneity. Finally, whether there is positive or negative assortative matching conveys broad implications for the e¢ ciency of matching and, moreover, …rm dispersion. Dependent on the direction of assortative matching, political investment can either widen or contract …rm divergence in performance.
The institutional environment of China provides a natural context for studying the matching of …rms and political capital. First, unlike democratic economies where campaign contributions 1 We discuss the literature in greater detail below.
serve as a main channel to invest in politics, 2 business entities in China rely on building personal connections (known as "guanxi") with governments. Hiring former politicians with attractive political background is an approach that has often been adopted (Li, 1998) . Second, unlike bribery-an alternative channel of political investment, recruiting politicians is legitimate under the rule of law. This means that it is possible to systematically quantify the latter type of interaction between …rms and politicians. Third, the Chinese political system features a clear political hierarchy where the political power of each level of politicians is strictly ordinal. This gives us an objective measure of each politician's political strength -and subsequently ability to contribute to each …rm through his/her political background. Given these characteristics, examining the politician employment of Chinese …rms o¤ers us a unique channel to study the matching in political markets.
We use a Chinese …rm-director level panel dataset to undertake the tasks. 3 The dataset reports a detailed biography for each individual (in total 36,308 individuals and 89,608 observations). The biography describes in detail each person's education level and previous work experience. We examine each biography and identify all the political positions previously held by each individual. We then match each position to the Chinese political hierarchy (Section 3) and classify its corresponding rank. 4 Our statistics show that more than 35 The dataset exhibits several features that are essential for studying political-market matching. First, as mentioned above the data allows us to treat political capital as a heterogeneous factor. Instead of using an indicator variable as in many earlier contributions (such as communist party membership in Li et al., 2008) , we di¤erentiate the rank of political positions held by each individual. We also control for the scope of each person's political connections using the number of previously held political jobs. These variables give us alternative measures of political strength that varies across individuals. Second, the data permits us to account for conventional human capital. It reports the education level and professional quali…cation of each individual. This information allows us to examine …rms'preference between political and conventional human capital and compare the matching with politicians to the matching with traditional labor. It also helps address the potential correlation between political accomplishment and education/professional attainment and estimate the relative price of political capital. 2 See Stratmann (2005) for a review of studies on political campaigns. 3 The data includes the population of Chinese publicly listed companies in the period of [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] with the exclusion of enterprises whose corporate governance is subject to government intervention. See Section 5 for more details of the data. 4 There were two challenges in constructing the data. First, the original biography information was presented in a descriptive format. This required extracting each individual's previous positions manually from the text. Second, mapping each position to the political hierarchy was a complex process given the vast Chinese political system. Finally, the panel nature of the data is useful for establishing the causality between …rm productivity and matching decision. We identify the new hires of each company in each year and examine how …rms'physical productivity and performance in a lagged period a¤ect their future matches with politicians. The …rm-director structure of data also makes it possible to evaluate the price premium of political capital within each …rm with the use of …rm-year …xed e¤ect and isolate the e¤ect of unobserved factors.
We proceed by …rst considering a simple matching model as a guide to the empirical analysis.
We build on the vast literature of matching theory led by Roy (1950) and Tinbergen (1951) and explore how the matching theory, traditionally applied to labor and marriage markets, can help explain the assignment between …rms and politicians. We consider a continuum of …rms, each characterized by a distinct "physical" productivity (determined by, e.g., the e¢ ciency of physical capital), and two types of human capital, both heterogeneous in ability. The …rst type consists of a continuum of conventional labor and the other a continuum of politicians. Politicians di¤er in their political strength and thus the ability to contribute to each …rm through their political background, knowledge and network. We assume that …rm physical productivity and the two types of human capital abilities are complementary in production.
The model yields three intuitive hypotheses. First is what we label as the positive assortative matching hypothesis, which predicts that more productive …rms will be matched with more capable human capital, including both conventional labor and politicians. The second hypothesis concerns the ability ratio of political and conventional human capital. The ratio is predicted to increase in …rm productivity when the politician markets are less dispersed than the conventional labor markets and in the relative importance of political capital ability in production function. Finally, we obtain a pay ratio hypothesis: the pay ratio of politicians relative to conventional labor is higher when the relative importance of political capital is larger.
The empirical evidence is broadly consistent with these predictions. We …nd that more productive …rms are signi…cantly more likely to have politically endowed individuals on board than their less e¢ cient competitors. They also tend to match with politicians from the higher levels of hierarchy, as expected from the …rst hypothesis. While a similar matching also applies to conventional human capital ability, more productive …rms exhibit a stronger preference for capable politicians as opposed to capable non-political labor. This is especially true when …rms are dependent on external …nancing, suggesting that the importance of political capital increases in …rms'reliance on credit access. The preference for politicians is also stronger when …rms are located in cities with lower government e¢ ciency where the value of political capital is likely greater. Controlling for endogenous matching and individual characteristics such as education and professional quali…cation, directors with political endowment receive signi…cantly more compensation than their co-workers, as expected from the pay ratio hypothesis. The political premium increases in the level of political rank and is greater in industries and locations where political capital exerts a larger value. A one-step rise in the political ladder from municipal to provincial level leads to 12 percent more pay. Conventional human capital, on the other hand, appears to a¤ect the compensation of existing directors mainly.
We argue that our results o¤er evidence of positive assortative matching where a match is mutually bene…cial to …rms and politicians rather than alternative explanations such as extortion by politicians. The latter interpretation would assume that …rms do not derive any bene…ts from political connections and the match is determined alone by politicians' self imposition. This interpretation is unlikely given the institutional environment in China where the direct in ‡uence of government o¢ cials on non-state controlled businesses has diminished substantially in the past decades. It is also inconsistent with our …nding that …rms with greater potential demand for political capital (because of, e.g., larger …nancial constraints) have a stronger preference for politicians. This …nding would not arise if …rms would not derive any value from political capital and it is only politicians that extract rents from the most pro…table …rms.
The assortative matching remains robust when we address the potential endogeneity of productivity using an instrumental variable (IV) approach in which the average productivities of upstream and downstream …rms located in the same province are employed as identifying instruments. The choice of these two IVs is motivated by the growing literature on productivity spillover between vertically linked industries. We construct the variables based on a large population of public and private …rms to mitigate sample selection. 5 Our results indicate that correcting for the potential endogeneity of …rm e¢ ciency does not change the positive matching between productive …rms and capable politicians. evidence based on Chinese …rm-level data. 6 Li et al. (2008) , for example, investigate the relationship between communist party membership and pro…tability of Chinese private …rms. They …nd that being a¢ liated to the communist party has a positive e¤ect on …rms'access to bank loans and con…dence in the legal system, the former of which is similarly shown in Bai et al.
(2005). 7 Du and Girma (2007) examine the e¤ect of political a¢ liation on …rms'survival and growth prospects. Their results indicate a robust positive relationship. This paper di¤ers from these studies by examining the endogenous decision of …rms to invest in political capital. Instead of treating …rms'political connections as an exogenous endowment, we examine how …rms with heterogeneous productivity and other characteristics such as external …nance dependence vary in their political investment decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss China's economic and bureaucratic reforms during the transition period and how they a¤ect the interaction between economy and bureaucracy. We then describe in Section 3 the structure of political hierarchy in China. In section 4, we build a simple matching model as a prelude to the empirical analysis and derive three main hypotheses. We describe the data and variable construction in Section 5.
In Section 6, we estimate the matching mechanism underlying …rms and politicians. In Section 7, we examine the price of political capital in comparison to conventional human capital. The paper concludes in section 8.
The Interaction of Economy and Bureaucracy in China
In the past three decades, China undertook a dramatic transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy. At the same time as this transition, several major reforms were implemented in the bureaucratic system. These economic and bureaucratic transitions have transformed the political incentives of Chinese …rms and the economic incentives of Chinese politicians. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the transformations.
The economic transition
At the outset of China's reforms in 1978, the state controlled virtually all aspects of the economy.
Since that time, China initiated a long sequence of economic restructuring by granting market forces a central role in determining the prices of goods, services and factors. This process is marked by two interrelated phenomena: the sharp decline of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the explosion of privately-controlled industrial activities.
As China started introducing market reforms, SOEs that were historically dependent on government protection and subsidies faced the dual challenge of increasing market competition and decreasing …scal support. Enterprises that had been idle before the reforms were quickly crowded out of the markets. According to the Chinese Industry Census data, the output share of state-owned enterprises plunged from 81 percent in 1980 to 15 percent in 2005. The number 7 While most existing studies …nd political connections have a positive e¤ect on …rm performance, there is also evidence of negative in ‡uence. Fan et al. (2007) , for example, show that politically connected CEOs can have an adverse impact on the post-IPO performance of newly privatized Chinese state-owned enterprises. The rationale there is that during the early privatization process political connections represent government intervention whose interests often di¤er from asset value and pro…t maximization.
of SOEs dropped by more than 90%. The remaining enterprises were forced to undertake drastic restructuring including a partial privatization process initiated in 1993 when the Company Law was adopted. This process greatly diversi…ed the corporate ownership of SOEs and transformed the role of government to the role of a shareholder. 8 The process did not, however, eliminate government intervention in the remaining state-controlled …rms. For example, the hiring decision of top executives in these …rms continues to be partially or even completely interfered by the government. 9 Given the primary interest of this paper is to examine the endogenous matching between …rms and politicians, we exclude enterprises whose shareholders include government entities at either central or local level. We focus instead on companies that are under little direct government in ‡uence and enjoy autonomy in their corporate governance. These include largely privatized former SOEs and privately owned businesses -a group that experienced a remarkable growth in the economic transition. However, all these transitions started in an environment where most important elements characterizing a sound institutional infrastructure, e.g., well-structured legal system, rigorous law enforcement, clearly-de…ned property rights, well-functioning …nancial markets, were still missing. The institutional constraints pose a direct impact on individual companies' performance and, consequently, corporate decisions targeted to improve …rms' relative competitiveness. For example, many studies such as Perkins and Rawski (2008) 9 There is however survey data such as the Shanghai Stock Exchange poll indicating a growing tendency of state-owned enterprises to pursue commercial interests and increasing autonomy given to SOE managers. This is attributed partly to the pro…t-seeking focus of SASAC and the continuing o¤ering of public shares.
share o¤erings, and bond issues continue to ‡ow mainly to state-controlled entities. This o¤ers a strong incentive for …rms to form ties with government. As described in the introduction, existing evidence (e.g., Bai et al., 2005; Li et al., 2008) show that political connections can help …rms secure access to bank loans and obtain favorable loan terms. One e¤ective channel to form political connections in China is to recruit politicians.
Raising external capital is not the only way politicians can contribute. Most …rm operations involving government licensing such as real estate development, raw material procurement, government contract, and export/import can potentially bene…t from political connections (Dickson, 2003) . In addition to the above, politicians can also improve e¢ ciency in dealing with government agencies and o¤er their regulatory and bureaucratic knowledge. We discuss next how the bureaucratic reforms in the past thirty years provided an opportunity for a growing interaction between businesses and government o¢ cials.
The bureaucratic reforms
Despite the lack of political liberalization, China has gone through a major transformation of its bureaucratic system. This transformation started in 1980 and consisted of three major reforms: the initiation of a mandatory retirement program, the granting of permission to bureaucrats to quit government positions and join businesses, and the decentralization of administrative responsibilities (Li, 1998 ).
The …rst reform addressed the promotion and retirement policy of bureaucrats. It was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1980 and aimed to "abolish the de facto lifetime tenure system of government o¢ cials". The reform introduced strict retirement ages for government o¢ cials and initiated a massive mandatory retirement program. It also o¤ered a one-time buyout strategy to compensate outgoing o¢ cials both economically and politically. As expected, this reform signi…cantly decreased the average retirement age and tenure of bureaucrats. According to the Chronicle of Contemporary Chinese Politics (1996), the average retirement age fell from 62 to 55 for provincial governors, from 64 to 58 for ministers, and from 58 to 50 for city mayors. 10 The average tenure per position decreased from 6.4 to 3.8 at the provincial governor level and from 6.6 to 4.4 at the minister level.
The second major reform is closely related to the …rst and was introduced in the mid1980s when bureaucrats were allowed to quit their government positions and join businesses, a phenomenon later known as xiahai ("leaping into the sea"). This was accompanied by the government's substantial e¤orts to downsize its agencies. Both of these measures, along with the mandatory retirement and buyout program, led to a large supply of former government o¢ cials who are motivated to join the business community to pursue higher economic returns.
This was documented in a 1995 survey of local government o¢ cials (State Commission of System Reform, 1996): close to 20 percent of interviewed o¢ cials were planning on xiahai. Of those, 35 percent were looking for joint-venture enterprises, 21 percent for private enterprises, and 15 percent for SOEs. A large number of bureaucrats also sought to found their own businesses and become private entrepreneurs.
The third reform is the administrative decentralization initiated in the mid 1980s. During the decentralization, considerable power and autonomy, including the authority to appoint subordinate government o¢ cials and to set economic regulations, was granted to local (provincial and municipal) governments. According to Naughton (2008) , local authorities in China today enjoy more autonomy than their counterparts in some former socialist countries (for example, the Soviet Union) or even democracies (for instance, India). Prominent examples include Guangdong and Zhejiang, two coastal provinces where o¢ cials have a large scope of discretion in setting economic policies. This gave businesses increasing incentives to build connections with local politicians. These politicians contribute their institutional knowledge, political background and network. In return, they become shareholders and managers.
An Overview of the Political Hierarchy
Before presenting our theoretical and econometric analysis, we discuss in this section the structure of Chinese political hierarchy. The political system in China features a strictly ordinal power structure. Politicians from a higher level of the political hierarchy oversee and possess more bureaucratic power than their subordinates. Once we classify the rank of each politician in the hierarchy it will be relatively straightforward to quantify the politician's relative political strength. In this section, we describe in detail the organizational structure of Chinese political system (Table A. 1 presents a summary). We start with the central government and then move to local governments.
Central government
The central government at the national level is composed of the National People's Congress 
Local governments
Local governments in China can be ranked at four levels. They include, from high to low, province, prefecture or municipality, county and township. 11 The higher-level government over- 
The hierarchy of Chinese politicians
Following the hierarchy of central and local governments, government o¢ cials are ranked at four levels in China. Generally speaking, o¢ cials of a higher-level government are ranked higher in the political hierarchy and have more political power than those at the lower levels.
Except the central party and state leaders at the national level, i.e., President, Premier and other top leaders, the highest ranked political position is "Bu". Provincial leaders (i.e., the provincial party secretary and governor) and ministers of State Council ministries and commissions are ranked at this level. The next rank is "Ting", which includes municipal-level positions (such as mayors) and department heads of government bureaus. 12 The third rank is "Chu" and includes county-level positions and directors of government divisions. The lowest rank is "Ke"; government o¢ cials at township level and section chiefs of government bureaus are at this level. In the Chinese political system, o¢ cials at the rank of "Bu" or "Ting" are considered as high-level o¢ cials.
In 1984, China replaced the two-rank down system with a one-rank down system as part of the decentralization. This means that, for example, the Central Committee only managed directly leaders at ministerial and provincial level. The decentralization greatly reduced the number of cadres directly managed by the Central Committee and enabled provincial leaders to gain almost complete control over appointments and dismissals of o¢ cials within their territorial jurisdiction. As a result of the 1984 reform, local governments, especially at the provincial level, revolved from an agent of the central government to governments with considerable resources and autonomy.
Theoretical Framework
As a prelude to the empirical investigation, we employ a simple matching model in this section to o¤er intuition to the sorting mechanism between …rms and politicians. We build on the vast literature of matching theory led by Roy (1950) and Tinbergen (1951) and explore in this paper how the matching theory, traditionally applied to labor markets, marriage markets, local public …nance and organization design, can also help explain the assignment in political markets. 13 
Basic setup
The economy consists of two sectors, one of which produces a homogeneous product and the other di¤erentiated products. Consumers have a CES sub-utility function for the di¤erentiated good given by
where q(i) represents the consumption quantity of variety i, the set of varieties available and the elasticity of substitution between varieties. Given this utility function, the equilibrium revenue of a …rm is
where p(i) is the price of the variety i, A E=
, and E is the country's total spending on the di¤erentiated product.
There is a continuum of …rms in the di¤erentiated product sector. Each …rm draws a distinct "physical" productivity , representing, for example, the e¢ ciency of physical capital and the level of endowed technology, from a distribution function F ( ). Following Melitz (2003), we assume follows a Pareto distribution, i.e., F ( ) = 1 ( = ) z where > > 0 and z > 1. From now onwards we suppress i and use to index …rms.
There are two types of human capital; one consists of a continuum of "conventional" labor (denoted as l) and the other a continuum of politicians (denoted as g). Both types of human capital are heterogeneous in ability, which we denote as a l and a g respectively. Speci…cally, we de…ne the political ability a g as a representation of the strength of political connections, the level of regulatory knowledge and the access to government resources. 14 The distribution functions of the two types of human capital abilities are given by H l (a l ) = 1 (a l =a l ) k l and
Each …rm employs a unit of human capital from either the conventional labor market or the politician market or both. We assume that output of each …rm (y) depends on the physical productivity of the …rm ( ), the conventional human capital ability (a l ), and the political capital ability (a g ):
where > 0 represents the marginal rate of technical substitution between political and conventional labor ability when a l = a g , and can vary, for example, across industries. This production technology assumes that there exists complementarity between …rm physical productivity and human capital abilities. Put di¤erently, the marginal bene…t of labor abilities, including both a l and a g , increases in …rm physical e¢ ciency and vice versa. 16 1 4 Alternatively, we can interpret a l and ag as two characteristics of labor. Each unit of labor draws a conventional human capital ability from the distribution function H l (a l ) and a political ability from Hg(ag). The two characteristics are independent of each other as consistent with the evidence reported in Table A.3 of Section 5. 1 5 The assumption of Pareto distribution is plausible for the politician market given the structure of Chinese political hierarchy. There are more than 1,400 counties in China, over 600 cities and 31 provincial units. This means that the number of politicians decreases exponentially as the political rank rises. 1 6 An alternative assumption is that there exists a substituting relationship between …rm e¢ ciency and labor abilities. This would reverse the matching mechanism we identify below. We present here the case of com-Finally, we use w l (a l ) and w g (a g ) to denote the pay rates o¤ered by the …rm to conventional labor and politicians, respectively. We assume that the pay is commensurate with the ability levels of the individuals in the following functional forms:
Competitive matching
Given w l (a l ) and w l (a l ), the pro…t maximization problem of each …rm can be written as:
where r( ) = A( a l a g ) . The …rst-order conditions for the two human capital abilities are:
These conditions imply that …rms with a larger revenue are matched with more capable conventional labor and politicians.
Using the …rst-order conditions, we can solve explicitly for human capital abilities as a function of …rm physical productivity. This yields:
where
Human capital market clearing
To complete the discussion, we discuss in this sub-section the pay rate functions, i.e., w l (a l ) and
), characterized at the human capital market equilibrium. For the human capital market to clear at each ability level, we need, for any , that the number of …rms with productivity higher than equals the amount of labor allocated to these …rms:
plementarity since its corresponding sorting hypothesis is the sorting mechanism supported by the empirical evidence. 1 7 Section 4.3 indicates that " > 0.
Hypotheses
Now we outline the main hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Inspecting equations (6) 
In other words, high-productivity …rms are matched with high-ability conventional labor and politicians. This prediction is a direct result of complementarity between …rm physical e¢ ciency and human capital ability, also known as the "supermodularity" condition in the matching literature. The literature has noted supermodularity as a su¢ cient condition for positive assortative matching.
Given equations (6), we can also obtain the ratio of political and conventional labor abilities:
where the market-clearing l , g , l and g are given in (8) . This gives us our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (Ability Ratio): The ability ratio a g ( )=a l ( ) increases in when k g < k l and .
This hypothesis suggests that when the conventional labor market is more dispersed than the politician market, more productive …rms not only are matched with more capable politicians but also exhibit a stronger relative preference for political ability. The latter is also true when , which captures the relative importance of political capital ability, is larger.
Now consider the pay ratio of politicians relative to conventional labor. Given equations (6), this ratio can be expressed as:
where the market-clearing l and g are given in (8) . This leads to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (Pay Ratio): The pay ratio of politicians relative to conventional labor w g ( )=w l ( ) increases in and exceeds 1 when > k g =k l .
This prediction suggests that a greater relative importance of political capital leads to a relatively greater pay to political capital.
Finally, we brie ‡y discuss the cuto¤ productivities of successful matches. This will help explain the empirical observation that while nearly all …rms have some level of conventional human capital, only a fraction of them (35 percent in our data) is matched with politicians. Let l and g denote, respectively, the productivities of …rms matched with the minimum human capital abilities a l and a g . We have l = a 1 l (a l ) and g = a 1 g (a g ), where a l (:) and a l (:) are de…ned in equations (6) . Comparing l and g suggests that when g a g g > l a l l , …rms will be sorted to three groups. Firms with < l will not be matched with any human capital. Firms with l < < g are matched with one unit of conventional labor whose ability exceeds a l but are not assigned to any politicians. Firms for which > g are matched with both a unit of conventional labor and a unit of politician.
Discussion
Finally, we make two additional remarks about our results. While we do not intend to exploit these remarks empirically in the paper, we believe they convey noteworthy implications. First, we note that, given the setting of the model, the positive assortative matching derived above is also the e¢ cient matching that maximizes the total output of all matches. This is a direct application of Koopmans and Beckmann's (1957) theorem of equivalence between the e¢ cient matching, which maximizes the sum of output among all feasible pairwise matches, and the competitive equilibrium matching, which obtains when each …rm takes as given wage rate schedules and choose the labor abilities that maximize its output. That said, one should, however, note that competitive matching can be ine¢ cient in the presence of frictions in the matching market (see, Legros and Newman, 2002) . Furthermore, the matching of …rms and political capital can result in social costs such as distortion in labor's incentive to raise conventional human capital ability.
The second notable implication of our results concerns …rm performance. While the assignment between …rms and human capital is predicted to improve individual …rms' performance, it raises the dispersion of …rm performance. This can be seen by considering the distribution function of r( ). With random matching between and labor abilities, the dispersion rate of r( ) is z where z is the shape parameter of …rm productivity distribution. With the positive assortative matching, the dispersion rate of r( ) rises to [1 + ( g + l )="] z. The least e¢ cient …rms can eventually be forced to exit reducing the degree of competition.
Data and Variable Construction
We use a Chinese …rm-director level panel dataset to examine the theoretical hypotheses in 
Director heterogeneity
The …rst part of the dataset is structured at …rm-director-year level. 18 The data reports the name, detailed biography, education, starting date and compensation of all the executives and board members associated with the publicly listed companies between 2004 and 2007. 19 The …ling of these information is required by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and is supplied by CSMAR. Table A .1). A position is ranked as 3 if it is at the level of "Bu". This includes provincial Party Secretaries, governors as well as ministers of State Council ministries and commissions. We rank a position as 2 if it is at the level of "Ting", which includes municipal-level positions (such as mayors) and department heads of government bureaus. The lowest rank that is taken into account is "Chu" and takes the value of 1. It includes county-level positions and directors of government divisions. 20 We also considered alternative weighting schemes, such as including only the highest ranks and allowing for a nonlinear e¤ect, and found the results largely similar.
As described in Section 1, the number and composition of participating politicians varies 1 8 We use the term director loosely in the paper and refer to both executives and board members. We considered distinguishing the two by taking into account only executives or board members. The results were qualitatively similar. In Section 7 where we examine the compensation, we focus exclusively on executives. 1 9 The monetary compensation reported in the data is the sum of salary and bonuses. In addition to monetary compensation, the data also reports the number of shares owned by each director. There are, however, many missing values in this information, which leads us to focus on the former in the empirical analysis.
2 0 We focus on bureaucratic ranks at or above "Chu" and do not take into account o¢ cials ranked at "Ke" (i.e., section chief of government bureau, township party secretary and magistrate). "Ke" is the lowest level of political hierarchy and considered to have the minimum power. Classifying this rank also requires considerable judgement. over time. Table A To measure conventional human capital, we take into account each individual's education and professional quali…cation. We measure education based on the highest degree earned.
This variable ranges from 1 to 5, with the values corresponding to, from low to high, no high school degree, high school, college, master's and doctoral degree. 21 The data shows there is little correlation between education and political endowment (Table A. 3). Among all the employed directors, people with stronger political capital do not appear to have received more education. In addition to education, we also observe each person's professional credentials and titles. A variety of common credentials and titles is considered, including, for example, Certi…ed Public Accountant (CPA), Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA), Economist and Engineer. 22 We use a dummy variable to represent these professional quali…cations. Table 1 The most basic is an indicator that equals 1 if the …rm recruited at least one former politician and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, we count the number of politicians recruited by each …rm. We also construct three measures to take into account politicians'di¤erential political strength. The …rst is the average highest political rank held by directors. The second is the average number 2 1 There are some missing values in the education variable. This led to a smaller number of observations whenever education was included in the estimation. 2 2 Professional credentials and titles are extremely popular in the Chinese labor market and often viewed as requisite for obtaining professional positions and promotion.
of political positions, which we use to measure the scope of political connections. The last is the average rank of previous positions. We essentially assume that the political ability matched to each …rm increases exponentially with its directors'average political rank and scope. 23 To capture …rms'preference for conventional human capital, we obtain the average education and professional quali…cation of directors and denote them as s l . Similarly, we assume a l = exp(s l ) .
Firm heterogeneity
The second part of the dataset includes the …nancial, location and ownership information of each …rm. The …nancial section of the data is obtained from COMPUSTAT 24 and company annual reports and covers the period of 2003-2007. 25 It includes information such as sales, employment, investment, and capital stock. 26 We estimate …rm productivity based on these information. A two-step semiparametric procedure is adopted. First, we use the methodology outlined in Olley and Pakes (1996) and estimate each …rm's total factor productivity (denoted as b it ). This measures each …rm's overall e¢ ciency, which, according to our model, consists of two components: the ability of existing directors (a l and a g ) and the …rm's physical e¢ ciency ( ). In the second stage, we use b it and information of a l;it and a g;it to retrieve estimates of it . This way we isolate the e¤ect of past recruitment on future hiring decision and focus on the role of …rm physical e¢ ciency in matching. To do so, we regress estimates of TFP, i.e., ln b it , on ln a l;it and ln a g;it and consider: 27 ln b it = 0 + 1 ln a l;it + 2 ln a g;it + " it :
The residuals of the above equation, " it , measure the part of TFP that is not explained by the ability of current directors, but rather the quality of physical capital (e.g., machinery and technology), intermediate inputs, and etc., and thus serve as a proxy for ln it . However, since a l;it and a g;it are decisions made based on …rm e¢ ciency, the simple OLS parameters will not be consistent. We thus invoke the method considered in Olley and Pakes (1996) and assume that " it follows a …rst-order Markov process and that a l;it and a g;it do not immediately respond to the innovation in productivity over last period's expectation, i.e., " it E[" it j" it 1 ]. This allows us to consistently estimate the parameters of ln a l;it and ln a g;it by regressing ln b i on ln a l;it and ln a g;it and a consistent estimate of " it :
2 3 We also considered alternative functional forms and found the results largely robust. 2 4 COMPUSTAT is a global database of …nancial and market information on publicly listed companies. It covers approximately 98% of the world's market capitalization. 2 5 Financial data earlier than 2003 contain many missing values, especially for employment. 2 6 Empolyment data in the COMPUSTAT is largely missing for Chinese …rms. We manually collected these data from published annal reports. The …nal sample of …rms is determined by the availability of the data. 2 7 We also included city-year and industry …xed e¤ect to control for the e¤ect of geographic and sectoral factors.
From the above regression, we obtain ln b it = ln b it b 1 ln a l;it b 2 ln a g;it which we use in the empirical analysis to examine the role of …rm physical productivity in future matching with politicians. 28 A two-year time lag is included between …rm e¢ ciency and hiring decisions. 29 6 The Matching of Heterogeneous Firms, Human Capital and
Politicians
Now we turn to the empirical analysis. We proceed by …rst examining the positive assortative matching and the ability ratio hypotheses, i.e., hypotheses 1-2. We consider the prediction on pay ratio in Section 7. Speci…cally, we take natural logs of equations (6) and obtain the following …rst empirical speci…cation:
where ln a g ( ) = s g ( ) and ln a l ( ) = s l ( ) measure the political and conventional human capital abilities matched to each …rm, 0g , 1g , 0l and 1l , summarize all the other parameters of equations (6), such as , , A, n and g , and are controlled for with a series of …xed e¤ects, e.g., city-year and industry (at SIC 3 digit level) dummies. 30 Hypothesis 1 predicts that 1g > 0 and 1l > 0. Alternatively, we substitute …rm revenue r( ) for …rm e¢ ciency as equations (5) predict a similar sorting between …rm size and labor abilities.
We then investigate the second hypothesis of Section 4, which predicts the ability ratio a g ( )=a l ( ) to increase in when g < l and in . Since the e¤ect of will be likely controlled for by the …xed e¤ects, we interact …rm e¢ ciency with proxies of when that is the case and consider the following speci…cation obtained by taking natural logs of equation (9):
Hypothesis 2 predicts that 1gl + 2gl ln > 0 if g < l and 2gl > 0. Table 3 reports the estimation results of speci…cation (13) using the total stock of directors.
The positive assortative matching hypothesis
As described in Section 5, we consider …ve measures of political capital, ranging from the basic dummy and count variables to measures that take into account the heterogeneous strength of politicians. We …nd signi…cant evidence of positive assortative matching between …rm physical e¢ ciency and director political strength. First, there is a positive and statistically signi…cant relationship between …rm productivity and the probability of having politicians on board. Column (1) of Table 3 indicates that a 100-percent increase in productivity is associated with 28
percentage points increase in the likelihood of employing a politician. 31 The ability of politicians is also stronger in more productive …rms as suggested by columns (3)- (5). The average rank of directors is 0.65 higher in …rms with twice the productivity. Table 3 also indicates positive assortative matching between …rm productivity and conventional human capital ability. More productive …rms tend to have directors with higher education and professional quali…cation.
[ Table 3 about here]
Next, instead of looking at the stock of directors we examine the in ‡ow of political and conventional human capital by considering only new hires. This helps address the possibility of reverse causality between …rm productivity and director abilities. Table 4 reports the estimates.
The dependent variables are constructed using newly hired directors only. 32 [ Table 4 about here]
In Table 5 , we examine the matching between …rm revenue and director abilities. As expected from Section 4, we …nd …rms with a larger revenue are matched with higher political 3 1 The results in column (1) are obtained based on a linear probability (LP) model. We use LP models to avoid the incidental parameter problem that would arise in …xed-e¤ect maximum-likelihood estimators. Recall two sets of …xed e¤ects are employed in our estimations to control for the e¤ect of unobserved characteristics. 3 2 Firms that did not have any new hires are not included in the analysis.
ability. Directors recruited by the larger companies are not only more powerful in terms of bureaucratic rank but also more experienced in terms of the number of held positions. Similar to Table 4 , there is a positive correlation between …rm revenue and new hires' professional quali…cation even though the correlation with education remains insigni…cant.
[ Tables 5 about here] 6.2 The ability ratio hypothesis
Now we proceed to the second hypothesis of Section 4 and examine whether more productive …rms exhibit a higher political to conventional labor ability ratio, especially when the relative importance of political capital captured in is high. To do so, we consider various measures of which can a¤ect the role of political capital in …rm operation. These measures include dependence on external …nance, foreign ownership and local governance quality. We discuss below how each of these factors a¤ects the relative value of politicians and consequently …rms' preference between political and conventional human capital.
Dependence on external …nance
As discussed in Section 2.1, a cross-country survey conducted by Batra et al. including internal …nancing and proceeds from equity and bond issuance. The lack of access to long-term capital and the resulting high dependence on self-fund raising constitutes a large impediment to business growth. An e¤ective approach to overcome this impediment is to build political connections.
We hence consider next how the ratio of political capital ability relative to conventional human capital varies across …rms dependent on their demand for external …nance. We consider two measures. First, we use a simple capital-labor ratio. We identify, for each industry, the median …rm's capital-labor ratio where capital is measured by the tangible …xed asset value and labor the size of employment. Second, we construct an industry speci…c measure of external capital dependence following the approach of Braun (2003) . This variable is measured for each industry by the median …rm's share of capital expenditure that is not …nanced with cash ‡ow from operation. Both of these variables are constructed based on all publicly listed companies.
We interact these variables with …rm productivity respectively and estimate speci…cation (14) . Tables 6 and 7 report the estimates. The evidence is broadly consistent with the expectation.
We …nd that more productive …rms tend to have a higher ratio of political ability relative to conventional human capital ability. This is especially true for …rms in capital intensive industries and industries with a larger external capital dependence. This …nding suggests that raising …rms'capital access is a value exclusive to political investment; it increases …rms'relative preference for political capital as compared to traditional human capital.
[ Tables 6-7 about here]
Foreign ownership
In this sub-section, we examine how the relative importance of political capital in …rm production To test the above hypotheses, we include in Table 8 an indicator variable that equals 1 if the …rm has more than 10 percent foreign ownership. The estimates suggest that …rms with a signi…cant foreign ownership have a lower ratio of political capital ability than their host-country domestic counterparts. This result lends support to the …rst two hypotheses where foreign owned …rms are predicted to derive less bene…t from employing politicians given the level of preference they already receive and the relatively lower level of dependence on host-country …nancing.
[ Table 8 about here]
As described in Section 2, local government o¢ cials in China retain a large degree of discretion after the administrative decentralization. For example, every investment contract has to be approved by some government level: provinces and economic zones have the authority to approve projects valued up to $30 million; county governments are able to approve projects below $10 million. Local governments are also responsible for enforcing national regulations such as the protection of intellectual property rights.
This decentralization led to a large dispersion in governance quality across administrative In this subsection, we investigate how geographic variation in governance quality a¤ects the relative importance of political capital in …rm operation and consequently the incentive to invest in political capital. We use the number of days dealing with governments available at the city level as a measure of government ine¢ ciency and interact it with …rm productivity. 33 Table   9 reports the estimation results of speci…cation (14) . We …nd that the degree of governance ine¢ ciency exerts a signi…cant e¤ect on …rms'incentive to recruit capable politicians as opposed to traditional human capital. At each productivity level, …rms located in cities with more ine¢ cient governments are matched with a signi…cantly higher ratio of political capital ability.
[ Table 9 about here]
Alternative explanation: extortion
In the above sections, we have interpreted our …ndings as evidence of positive assortative matching between …rms and politicians. Now we examine whether there is an alternative interpretation that can plausibly explain these …ndings. The most likely alternative interpretation of our results would be a story of "extortion". In this explanation, the positive assignment we found empirically would be interpreted not as a mutually bene…cial match but rather the self imposition by politicians. This argument relies on three assumptions. First, politicians possess the power of imposing themselves on non-state controlled …rms. Second, …rms do not derive any bene…ts from political connections. Finally, more powerful politicians would select the more productive and hence more pro…table …rms.
The …rst two assumptions are largely unlikely given the current institutional environment in China. As discussed in Section 2, with the proliferation of privatization, the direct in ‡uence of government o¢ cials on non-state controlled businesses has diminished substantially. These assumptions are also inconsistent with our results in Section 6.2. We found that the positive assignment between …rm productivity and political ability is particularly strong for industries with high external …nance dependence and cities with high government ine¢ ciency. These results suggest that …rms are more likely to match with politicians, especially those from the higher level of politician hierarchy, when there is likely a greater demand for political capital.
If …rms did not derive any bene…ts from political connections and the match is driven completely by politicians selecting and extracting rents from the most pro…table …rms, the matching mechanism would not vary across industries or locations in a systematic manner. More powerful politicians would simply pick the more pro…table …rms without giving any attention to the …nancial constraint faced by the …rms.
The potential endogeneity of productivity
So far, we have examined the e¤ect of lagged productivity on …rms'decisions to invest in political and conventional human capital. The use of a time lag between …rm attribute and investment decision helps establish the causal e¤ect. Nonetheless, there still can be concerns of potential endogeneity in the estimated parameter of productivity due to, for example, omitted variables or reverse causality.
To address this concern, we employ in this subsection an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
Plausible instruments in this case include the average productivities of upstream and downstream …rms located in the same geographic region. The choice of these instruments is motivated by the growing economics literature on technology spillover, including the recent studies by Javorcik (2004), Haskel et al. (2007) , and Keller and Yeaple (2007) . 34 Javorcik (2004) , for example, …nds signi…cant evidence of productivity spillover through backward linkage between foreign multinational and domestic …rms. She shows that high productivity in downstream industries raises the productivity of upstream …rms. In light of these …ndings, we construct two identi…cation groups for each Chinese …rm in the sample: (i) …rms from upstream industries and located in the same province; (ii) …rms from downstream industries and the same province.
We compute the (input-output coe¢ cient) weighted average productivity of each group and use them as the instruments.
We include both public and private …rms in the IV construction. Data of private …rms is obtained from Oriana, a comprehensive database containing …nancial information of public and private companies in over 30 countries including the Middle East and Asia-Paci…c regions such as China. Based on this database, we obtain each …rm's basic …nancial and industry information and calculate their productivity. 35 The input-output table used to compute the weighted average is taken from the OECD input-output database.
Similar to the literature, we …nd evidence of productivity spillover between vertically linked industries. The productivity of local downstream industries is positively correlated with upstream …rms'e¢ ciency. Similar is true for forward linkage: more productive upstream suppliers raise the productivity of downstream …rms. Correcting for the potential endogeneity of productivity does not, however, change the matching of …rms and politicians. As shown in Table   10 , more productive …rms continue to exhibit a stronger incentive to invest in political capital.
[ Table 10 about here]
The Price of Political Capital: The Pay Ratio Hypothesis
After examining the matching of …rms and politicians, we ask next: What is the relative price of political capital as compared to conventional human capital? Recall hypothesis 3 of Section 4 predicts that the pay ratio of politicians relative to traditional labor increases in the relative importance of political capital and exceeds 1 when is su¢ ciently large.
We test this hypothesis by considering the log form of equation (10) .
where 1w is expected to be positive and 0w + 1w ln > 0 means that politicians receive a greater pay than their non-political co-workers. Let d g denote an indicator variable that equals 1 if a director has previously held political positions and 0 otherwise. We can rewrite the above equation to:
where w( ) is the level of compensation o¤ered to each director by each company (observed at …rm-director-year level) 36 , a l includes conventional human characteristics, and ( ) represents a vector of …rm-year dummies and controls for all time-variant …rm-level characteristics. This speci…cation controls for the nonrandom matching between …rms and human capital (including political human capital). It essentially estimates the price premium of political capital, i.e., 0w + 1w ln , based exclusively on within-…rm variation. 37 Alternatively, we can replace d g with political ability a g to estimate the marginal e¤ect of political ability.
We begin by …rst including the entire sample of executives, without di¤erentiating existing and new hires. Table 11 reports the results. We …nd that politicians receive signi…cantly greater compensation than their non-political co-workers as indicated by the positive and statistically signi…cant parameter of the politician indicator. The pay gap is around 10 percent and is especially large for …rms in industries with higher external …nance dependence, as expected from hypothesis 3 in Section 4. Firms located in cities with higher government ine¢ ciency also tend to o¤er a greater pay premium to politically endowed directors.
In the last four columns of Table 11 , we replace the politician indicator variable with the political rank. The results indicate that a one-step increase in political rank leads to, on average, 6 percent increase in annual pay though the magnitude of the e¤ect varies with the level of political rank. This exceeds the marginal e¤ect of raising education attainment by one tier (e.g., from college to master degree) and obtaining professional credential.
[ Table 11 about here]
Now we restrict the sample to new hires. This further mitigates the potential concern of correlation between the main explanatory variables and residuals, which can arise among existing directors. Table 12 reports the results. We …nd that newly hired directors with political capital receive signi…cantly more pay than their colleagues in the same cohort. A one-step increase in political ladder leads to 7 percent increase in the compensation o¤er. When we di¤erentiate the political ranks, we note that a one-step rise from Chu (third rank) to Ting (second rank) or from Ting to Bu (…rst rank) results in 12 percent more pay. This implies a pay premium of approximately US$5800. The e¤ect of education attainment, on the other hand, appears insigni…cant.
[ Table 12 about here]
Conclusion
Politician recruiting is an increasingly common phenomenon in China since the great economic transformation. It was exacerbated as the country undertook a sequence of bureaucratic reforms -raising the supply of local politicians -and a privatization process that led to a growing demand for political connections.
We investigate in this paper how the di¤erential decisions of …rms to engage in political investment lead to a positive assortative matching of …rms and politicians. We also examine how the matching mechanism in the political capital markets compares to the matching in traditional labor markets. Our results indicate that more productive …rms are consistently more likely to hire politically endowed individuals than their less e¢ cient competitors. They also tend to recruit politicians from a higher level of political hierarchy as suggested by the positive matching hypothesis of the model. The preference for political capital ability relative to conventional human capital increases in …rms'dependence on external …nancing and the level of government ine¢ ciency, but decreases in the extent of foreign ownership. We argue that these results o¤er evidence of mutually bene…cial matching rather than alternative explanations such as extortion.
The possibility that the matches are driven completely by politicians'self imposition on the most pro…table …rms is unlikely given that …rms with greater …nancial constraints clearly employ more and stronger politicians. The assortative matching remains robust when we address the potential endogeneity of productivity using an IV approach and employing the average productivities of upstream and downstream …rms located in the same province as identifying instruments.
In addition to the endogenous matching, we examine the relative price of political capital in comparison to conventional human capital. We …nd that directors with political endowment receive signi…cantly more compensation than their co-workers. The political premium increases in the level of political strength and the potential importance of political capital. A one-step increase in the political ladder from, for example, municipal to provincial level leads to 12 percent more pay. Education attainment, on the other hand, appears to a¤ect the compensation of existing directors only.
Our analysis conveys a number of broad implications. First, our results indicate that there is a signi…cant variation, even within each industry, in the decisions to engage in political investment. Second, by introducing heterogeneity in factor markets including the markets of political labor, our paper helps identify potential sources of …rm heterogeneity in overall e¢ ciency. The role of political capital matching as a potential source of overall heterogeneity is particularly important in economies with under-developed institutional environment. Finally, our …nding of positive assortative matching between …rms and politicians suggests that the extent of …rm dispersion in performance can be further widened as a result of political market assignment. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Notes: (i) robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; (ii) ***, ** and * represent statistical signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
